Specific Performance of Contract to Adopt - Besche v. Murphy by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 7
Specific Performance of Contract to Adopt -
Besche v. Murphy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Specific Performance of Contract to Adopt - Besche v. Murphy, 10 Md. L. Rev. 72 (1949)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol10/iss1/7
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT
TO ADOPT
Besche v. Murphy1
Plaintiff-appellant was cared for by an elderly aunt
after the death of her parents. When she was eight years
old (1893) the decedent and her husband orally offered
to adopt her provided they were given unconditional cus-
tody. The child was told she was being adopted, both her
given and surname were changed, and she was thereafter
known as the daughter of decedent in all aspects of her
life although she was never adopted as provided by statute
in 1892. When in 1907 she married, invitations were ex-
tended by her foster mother to the wedding of "her
daughter". The foster mother died testate in 1946 leaving
no husband or issue surviving, in fact no children had ever
been born to her. By her will she bequeathed the sum of
five hundred dollars "unto Stella Besche whom I raised
since childhood", then after several other pecuniary be-
quests she gave all the rest and residue of her estate to
"those persons who under the laws of the State of Maryland
would take in case of intestacy". Plaintiff asked to be ac-
corded the same rights of inheritance and distribution in
the estate as if she had been formally adopted, in which
case she would be the only one entitled to receive the
residuary estate. The trial court dismissed the bill and
the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the court could
not declare an adoption after the death of the testatrix
and in the absence of such adoption the plaintiff did not
come within or constitute the class of those to whom the
property was left.
Appellant relied strongly upon Clayton v. Heptasophs.2
In that case, plaintiffs while young children, were taken to
be reared in 1881 before the enactment of any legal method
of adoption in the State. In 1894, after such legislation had
been enacted the foster father took out a certificate of
insurance in the defendant organization, naming the plain-
tiffs as beneficiaries and describing them therein as
"adopted children". At that time the rules of the society
permitted the designation of children as beneficiaries with-
out specifying if adopted children were included. In 1913,
the by-laws were amended to allow payment of benefits to
adopted children only if legally adopted. The foster father
'59 A. 2d 499 (Md. 1948).
'130 Md. 31, 99 A. 949 (1917).
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continued to pay the fees on the certificate until his death
in 1915 but he never complied with the adoption statute.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of plaintiff's right
to recover through an estoppel against the society, which
had accepted payments for 21 years in knowledge of the
status of the children. As the Court pointed out these chil-
dren could not have been legally adopted in 1913 as they
were then adults and the then extant law did not cover
the adoption of adults. In the opinion, Judge Stockbridge
made the following dictum statement which is supported
by the apparent weight of authority in this country, and
relied upon by appellant in the instant case, "the authori-
ties very generally establish the proposition that a parol
obligation by a person to adopt the child of another as his
own, accompanied by the virtual, though not statutory
adoption, and acted upon by both parties during the ob-
ligor's life, may be enforced upon the death of the obligor,
who dies without disposing of the property by his will".3
To this contention the Court replied that the residuary
clause in decedent's will indicated that she did not intend
to die intestate as to any part of her property. The direc-
tion that the residue of her estate should go to those persons
who, under the laws of the State of Maryland, would take
in the case of intestacy, did not create an intestacy, but
simply provided a means by which it may be determined
who are the beneficiaries of the residue. The Court stated
that such beneficiaries take under the will and not under
the intestacy statute,4 citing Suman v. Harvey.5 In this
case the executors were directed to convert an estate into
cash and to distribute the proceeds among the heirs at
law and next of kin of the testatrix "who may be entitled
thereto under the laws of Maryland". There was an at-
tempt to show that the testatrix intended that children
of his deceased first cousin should take along with surviving
first cousins, but the court said that only those answering
the description at the time of testatrix's death were entitled
to share in the estate, and as the statute of descent and
distribution did not entitle such children to take as heirs
at law and next of kin, no evidence was admissible to vary
the terms of the will, quoting Jarman on Wills to the effect
8 Ibid, 36.
'By laws of 1916, Ch. 325, descent of realty Is same as for distribution
of personalty, as codified in Md. Code (1939), Art. 46, Sec. 1. See also, Md.
Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec. 132: "If there be children and no other
descendants, the surplus shall be divided equally amongst them:" and
Sec. 133, providing for representation by children of a deceased child.
'114 Md. 241, 79 A. 197 (1911).
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that persons answering the description at the death of
testator take the property "in the character of devisee and
not as formerly by descent."'
The first square presentment of this question to the
Maryland Court of Appeals was embodied in this case.
The decision is of interest because of the light it throws
on the attitude of the Maryland Court toward certain
aspects of the adoption status.7
The common law did not recognize adoption, and statu-
tory adoption was not provided in Maryland8 until 1892'
and even later in England," being brought about through
the influence primarily of the civil law countries (and
through them to the civil law states here) where it has
long been known, principally as a device for fixing inheri-
tance rights." Being in derogation of the common law,
the common law courts have required strict compliance
with the statute before recognizing an adoption. 12 It is on
this ground also that some courts have held that a contract
to adopt does not admit of specific performance after death.
That this construction is the proper one has been questioned
as contrary to the implied legislative intent to change com-
pletely the common law so as to conform to the civil law
concept of the adoptive status. 3
Inheritance rights, like most matters pertaining to adop-
tion, are regulated generally by statute.14 The general rule
construes such statutes liberally in respect to the adopted
child's right to share the estate of his foster parents, even
to the extent of decreasing the share of the surviving
spouse, 5 but not usually with respect to inheritance from
ancestors or collaterals. According to this view one cannot
make a child the relative of another, not a party to the
02 JARMAN, WILLS, 905.
1For a review of the then extant adoption law see Strahorn, Adoption
in Maryland (1943), 7 Md. L. Rev. 275. A survey of the recent revision of
the statute is in preparation, later to be published in the RMwEW.
8Md. Laws 1892, Ch. 244. See present statute, Md. Code Supp. (1947)
Art. 16. Sees. 85A-85S.
0 Hiss v. McCabe, 45 Mo. 77 (1876), dictum statement that an "adopted"
daughter was not a daughter who could claim by inheritance; Fisher v.
Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71 A. 999 (1909), dictum statement that it was proper
that the "adopted" son did not take inasmuch as the adoption law of
1892 bad been passed subsequent to the death of the testator.
10 16 and 17 Geo. V., C. 29.
n Anno., 39 Am. St. Rep. 210; Ann. Cas. 1914D, 572.
Anno., Ann. Cas. 1916 D 1110.
IsMarkover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N. E. 1047 (1892) ; see also 17
L. R. A. 806, anno., 16 A. L. R. 1024.
14 Massachusetts apparently passed the first adoption statute in 1851.
This statute was used as a model by other states. In all the early statutes,
the inheritance provisions were inadequately treated.13 Supra, n. 13.
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contract, by the process of adopting him oneself, although
some states allow the adopted child to take by representa-
tion.'" The adopting parent has the same right to disinherit
his adopted child as if his natural child.17 Prior to 1947,8
the Maryland adoption statute provided,"9 the effect of
such decree of adoption shall be to entitle the child so
adopted to the same rights of inheritance and distribution
as to the petitioner's estate,-as if born to such petitioner
in lawful wedlock-; and2" the term child or its equivalent
in a deed, grant, will or other written instrument shall be
held to include any child adopted by the person executing
the same, unless the contrary plainly appears by the term
thereof, whether such instrument be executed before or
after the adoption.21
A contract to adopt is not ordinarily considered to be
against public policy per se.22 Consideration is adequate if
the obligations of the filial relationship are performed and
past performances will serve to take such a contract, if
oral, outside the Statute of Frauds.23 A contract to adopt
may not ordinarily be sued on for specific performance,
during the lifetime of the adopting parent however, for
want of mutuality of remedy. As pointed out by the Mary-
land Court the law here provided that adoption proceed-
ings might only be consummated where the best interests
of the child so directed and equity would not ordinarily
enforce a contract to create such a relationship.
As expected, executory contracts for adoption of chil-
dren have come before the courts for enforcement almost
always after the death of the promisor and for the purpose
of recovering from his estate the share of the child claimed
by virtue of the contract. Laches will not operate as a
"Note, Wills-Adopted Child Not Included iv Devise to Children of
Testator's Son (1925), 34 Yale L. J. 805; but see Eureka Life Ins. Co. v. Gels,
121 Md. 196, 88 A. 158 (1913), and MacNabb v. Sheridan, 181 Mid. 245,
29 A. 2d 271 (1942). Maryland has now enacted the liberal view, see Md.
Code Supp. (1947), Art. 93, Sec. 139A.
"Malaney v. Cameron, 99 Kan. 70. 161 P. 1180 (1916). affirming judgment
on rehearing, 98 Kan. 620, 159 P. 19 (1916), additional rehearing denied,
99 Kan. 677. 162 P. 1172 (1917).
18 Repealed in toto by Md. Laws 1947, Ch. 599.
'
9 Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, Sec. 81.
2 0Md. Code (1939), Art. 16. See. 83.
21 Compare Md. Code (1947 Supp.) Art. 16, Sees. 85 K (a), (c), M.
2 2 Lynn v. Hockaday, 162 Mo. 111, 61 S. W. 885, 85 Am. St. Rep. 480 (1901),
and many others.
"Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N. W. 330. 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130.
12 Ann. Cas. 140 (1907) ; Nowack v. Berger. 133 Mo. 24, 34 S. W. 489.
31 L. R. A. 810, 54 Am. St. Rep. 663 (1896) ; Clayton v. Heptasophs. supra,
n. 2.
. Reed v. Reed, 165 Md. 604, 169 A. 798 (1934). Carlin v. Bacon, 322 Mo.
435, 16 S. W. 2d 46, 69 A. L. R. 1 (1929).
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defense to an action brought at this time, -il and authority
is overwhelming in holding that the fact the contract was
made with a third person for the benefit of the child will
not prevent enforcement by the child."' The standards of
proof required to establish the contract, either written or
oral, have usually been rigorous, and it has been held that
a mere declaration of an intention to adopt is insufficient.
Nevertheless a parol agreement to adopt may be established
by the acts, admissions, and conduct of the parties, and in-
ferences therefrom. " Two types of cases may be distin-
guished, a promise to make the child the heir of the promis-
or, either distinct from any agreement to adopt, or as a
part, express or implied, of a contract of adoption; and a
contract for adoption without any provision in respect of
property rights of the child. In the latter case, the relief
prayed is usually to obtain the property right given by
statute to an adopted child. 9
The decisions of the courts have not been unanimous in
respect to the enforcement of such contracts. Those courts
which will decree specific performance of a contract to
make the child an heir, or to adopt with the incidental
right of inheritance, do not undertake to alter the status
of the parties or to hold that the child takes as an heir,
since they generally agree that equity does not have power
to decree an adoption. 0 Rather the relief allowed derives
from the power of equity to enforce a contract fully per-
formed on one side by decreeing performance of the prom-
ise of inheritance even if only implied from the agreement
to adopt.9 In other words, equity places the child in a posi-
Carlin v. Bacon, ibid.
See Anno. 2 A. L. R. 1198, 73 A.. L. R. 1395.
7 Heath v. Cuppel, 163 Wis. 62, 157 N. W. 527 (1916).
" Roberts v. Roberts, 223 F. 775, (C. C. A. 8th, 1915), cert. denied 239 U. S.
639 (U. S. 1915).
0 Supra, n. 22.
0 Supra, n. 17. But in Missouri, the statutory method of adoption has
been held to be merely permissive, and an adoption may be accomplished
by a fully executed contract alone, Lindsley v. Patterson, 177 S. W. 826,
(Mo. 1915) L. R. A. 1.915 F. 680.
81 The following states may be considered to have given support In a
proper case to the inheritance rights of the "quasi-adopted" child : Arizona,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minneqota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Texas. In addition the decisions of the following states
tend in that direction: Alabama, Arkansas, California. Recent decisions
from these jurisdictions are Stanley v. Wacaster. 206 Ark. 872, 178 S. W.
2d 50 (1944) ; Butler v. Ross, 188 Ga. 329, 4 S. E. 2d 21 (1939) ; Bergman
v. Carson, 226 Iowa 449, 284 N. W. 442 (1939); Thompson v. Moseley,
344 Mo. 240, 125 S. W. 2d 860 (1939) ; In re Clarke's Estate, 105 Mont. 401,
74 P. 2d 401, 114 A. L. R. 496 (1937). Many others nre noted in the
opinion. In addition see In re Blehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. 2d 1112
(1933) and Sunior v. Sunlor, 20 Ohio App. 479, 152 N. E. 729 (1925).
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tion equal to that which he would have occupied in respect
of inheritance, but conditional upon his having fully per-
formed the obligations of a child to the adopting parent.2
When this consideration fails as when the parent dies be-
fore the child becomes a member of his family and the
adoption itself was invalid, an agreement to make the child
his heir was held to be unenforceable against his estate.3
In this connection it is of interest to note one case where
relief sought was denied because it asked to establish an
adoption after the death of the parties agreeing to adopt; 4
and others in which a child is allowed to take as the natural
child of its adopting parent through an estoppel worked
upon the legal heirs which was based upon an agreement
to adopt followed by virtual but not statutory adoption,
or as is sometimes stated, estoppel against the adopting
parents or their privies. 5 A defective adoption has some-
times been construed as a contract to adopt. 6 In general,
where there is an agreement to adopt and nothing more,
relief has more often been limited to cases where the adopt-
ing parent died intestate, and this point is given special
emphasis by the Maryland Court. Certainly where there
is a will, the claim by an "adopted" child of an agreement
that he should inherit should be closely scrutinized if
justice is to be accorded natural children. As pointed out
by the Oklahoma Court in Clemons v. Clemons,37 one hav-
ing custody of another's child is not compelled to adopt him
or to make him an heir.
A minority takes the position that no rights are con-
ferred where the statute is not fully complied with, hence
no adoption, no inheritance.3 In this group also might be
included those cases holding that in the absence of a clause
In Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 39 N. Mex. 256, 45 P. 2d 927 (1935),
the Court held that specific performance of a contract to adopt, being
impossible after promisor's death, equity will indulge fiction, that there
was an adoption, apply statute of descent and distribution, and decree
succession of children to prevent fraudulent destruction of their equity.
u Jaffee v. Jacobson, 48 F. (C. C. A. 8th, 1891) 21.
" St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., infra, n. 36.
'SIn re Gunn's Estate, 227 Mich. 368, 198 N. W. 983 (1924). See also,
Thompson v. Moreley, supra, n. 31; Milligan v. McLaughlin, 94 Neb. 171,
142 N. W. 675 (1913) ; 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1134. Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex.
398, 143 S. W. 2d 906 (1940) ; 142 A. L. R. 77.
UAnderson v. Blakesly, 155 Iowa 430. 136 N. W. 210 (1912) ; but contra,
St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483,
206 N. W. 921 (1926).
193 Okla. 412, 145 P. 2d 928 (1943).
St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., supra,
n. 36. Davis v. Jones' Adm'r., 94 Ky. 320, 22 S. W. 331, 42 Am. St. Rep. 360




saving existing contracts in subsequent legislation, con-
tracts of adoption entered into at a time when there was
no statutory method of adoption will be ineffective to
give the child any of the attributes of an heir. 9
As far as the legally adopted child is concerned, his
rights of inheritance will not be impaired by circumstances
that the Statute of Descent and Distribution does not refer
to adopted children, as he is generally held to be included
by the term "children" as used in the statute, and even
by the word "issue" in some cases." But inheritance under
this construction is usually limited to cases where strict
compliance with the statute of adoption has obtained.4' The
right of the legally adopted child to take under a will is
governed by the intent of the testator rather than by the
right of the child as an heir, and the tendency is to construe
the term "children" narrowly so as to exclude adopted
children unless a contrary intent appears.42 In the construc-
tion of instruments much emphasis is placed upon the term
of the adoption statute, if the act puts an adopted child in
the same place as a child by birth for purposes of inheri-
tance the adopted child will be included by the term "chil-
dren" in instruments executed by adopting parent only;
but if the act deems the adopted child to be the same as if
born of the marriage of the adopting parents the adopted
child is included by the term "children" in instruments ex-
ecuted by anyone.
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of
the United States requires only that a court recognize the
adoption status of a child adopted in another state; it does
not compel one state to recognize the law of a foreign
state with respect to the effect of adoption on the scheme
of intestate succession.43
Several Maryland decisions are of interest in this con-
nection. In Eureka Life Ins. Co. v. Geis,44 the mother of
the adopting parent devised certain ground rents to her
own "right heirs". The Court held that the adopted grand-
child could not take, and cited the statute45 to the effect that
8 Wall v. McEnnery's Estate, 105 Wash. 445, 178 P. 6,31 (1919).
'
0 Anno., 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 914; Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 786; L. R. A. 1918 F,
1084.
'1 In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440; 68 A. 1038, 123 Am. St. Rep. 673
(1908).
41In re Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601, 5 A. L. R. 1277
(1918) ; contra, in re Woodcock, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821, 125 Am. St. Rep.
291 (1907).
"In re Zoell's Estate, 345 Pa. 413, 29 A. 2d 31 (1942).
"Supra, n. 16.
"Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, See. 83.
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an adopted child was then included by the term "child"
only in an instrument executed by the adopting parent. In
a similar case, but one involving an intestacy, MacNabb v.
Sheridan,4 appellee was an adopted daughter of a brother
of descendent who had predeceased him. The property had
been sold by a trustee appointed by the Court and the
auditor's report of the sale had excluded the adoptive niece.
Her exceptions were sustained by the trial court and the
trustee appealed, but he was not joined by any of the other
heirs. The Court of Appeals glossed over the question of
the rights of the adoptive niece entirely, by finding that
the statute41 which permitted an appeal by a trustee alone
was not applicable here and so they had no occasion to
reverse a lower ruling which was probably erroneous as
the law then stood.
In contrast to Clayton v. Heptasophs48 where an estoppel
was permitted to prevent the disinheritance of children not
legally adopted, we have Legion of Honor v. Green." The
by-laws of the society provided that beneficiaries under the
society's certificates were limited to "relations" and "de-
pendents", and the certificates provided for their own avoid-
ance in the case of false representations. Decedent's bene-
ficiary was listed as his niece, but she was neither related
nor dependent upon him. Estoppel based on knowledge of
truth by official of society who witnessed the application
was rejected, and recovery was denied both because of
falsity in the certificate and failure to come within the
permissible classes. Zimmerman v. Thomas"0 presented
several facets of the adoption question to the Maryland
Court. In that case a hospital had been authorized by
statute to bind out the children in its care, and the plaintiff
was so bound out prior to the enactment of any statute
of adoption. The adopting parent's brother left property
to the "children" of that parent, and plaintiff's right to
inherit thus came up.
The Court held that the enabling act and the indenture
did not constitute a valid adoption, although most of the
attributes of that status were included by the relationship
created. "Child" in a legal document being construed as
adopted child only when used in documents executed by
the adopting parent, the Court indicated that plaintiff would
'a Supra, n. 16.
"7 Md. Code (1939), Art. 5, Sec. 43.
Supra, n. 2.
"71 Md. 263, 17 A. 1048, 17 Am. St. Rep. 27 (1889).
152 Md. 263, 136 A. 637 (1927).
1949]
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have been precluded in this case even if properly adopted
under the 1892 act 5 1
In the principal case, the Maryland court states it is
not asked to decree appellant the adopted child of decedent,
but only to place her in the same testamentary position. It
then says that since it cannot declare her to be the child
(by adoption) of testatrix, it cannot place her in the desired
testamentary position. The only conclusion remaining is
that Maryland will not permit specific performance of a
contract to adopt nor any of its equitable attributes, at
least where there is not an actual intestacy. It has been
said5 2 "it is significant that the liberal position (re inheri-
tance by adopted child) is expressed chiefly by courts west
of the Mississippi River. Perhaps the peculiar geographical
division can be explained, in part, by the fact that the
principle of consanguinity did not take a firm hold in the
Western states, where pride was taken in an asserted free-
dom from "hide-bound tradition". In 1947 the rights of
adopted children were further liberalized by the Maryland
Legislature with respect to inheritance from collaterals 5
If the instant question should arise again, might not the
Maryland Court construe this enactment as an expression
of legislative policy tending toward a more liberal inter-
pretation of the adoptive status in general?
IMMUNITY FROM PROCESS OF ONE INDUCED
BY FRAUD TO COME TO STATE
Margos v. Moroudas'
This case was a consolidation of two suits, one brought
by Mary Margos for personal injuries sustained by her
while riding in an automobile operated by the defendant,
Gus Moroudas, and the second brought by Mike Margos,
" But see Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 93, Sec. 139A, quoted infra, n. 53.
2Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child (1943),
28 Wash. U. Law Quart. 221, 236.
"Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 93, Sec. 139A: "In the application of the
provisions of this sub-title there shall be no distinction between a legally
adopted child and a child by birth, to the end that such adopted child
shall take from, through and as a representative of its adopting parent or
parents, and the lineal or collateral kindred of such adopting parent or
parents in the same manner as a child by birth and to the end that upon
the death of an adopted child intestate without surviving descendants,
such child's property, exclusive of the share of such child's surviving
spouse, shall pass and be distributed in the same manner as if such child
had been born to such adopting parent or parents in lawful wedlock."
'184 Md. 362, 40 A. 2d 816 (1945).
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